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AkLTHOUGH most laymen who have been parties to a lawsuit entertain posi-
tive opinions about the "high cost of litigation,"' and although the subject
affects both the prestige and economic welfare of the legal profession, this
problem has received remarkably little critical analysis.2 Attempts have been
made to reduce expense and standardize civil procedure,3 but the problem
of distributing court costs and attorneys' fees between litigants has been
generally neglected.4 The courts consistently refrain from interfering with
the incidence of legal expenses except in the award of "costs," 5 which the
judge orders the losing litigant to pay the prevailing party. Costs are the-
oretically given to indemnify the winning party against the expense of main-
taining his cause and to punish the losing party for subjecting his opponent
to the expense of an unfounded claim or defense ;G but actually the nominal
sums awarded achieve no such result.7 The wealthy litigant is not hindered
in bringing groundless claims; the fear of costs frequently prevents the poor
litigant from bringing just claims," and the strike-suitor bent on capitalizing
his nuisance value generally finds the courts open without rebuke." Clearly,
the victim of an action brought in bad faith or a party thwarted by obstruc-
1. "I was never ruined but twice-once when I gained a lawsuit, and once when
I lost one."--Voltaire. For a recent outburst, see Cormier, The High Cost of Lawirg
(Mfarch 1939) 46 Am. MAERcumy 293.
2. The relative absence of statistics on civil case activity, making authoritative
treatment of the problem difficult, may account for the scarcity of scholarship in this
field. See CLAm K S Hm i.,r, A STUDY Or LAw Am DINisT rIO.z .. CO.m. crxcu
(1937) 1, 220.
3. For attempts to acquaint the public with the nature of legal advice, where it is
available, and its value as a preventative, see Llewellyn, The Problem of Undone Legal
Service (1940) 26 A.B. A. J. 38. It has long been urged that the only logical solution
of the dilemma of legal expense lies in requiring the government to pay the costs of
justice, much as it provides highways and education. See Wilson, Lalyers Bills- Who
Should Pay Them? (1896) 12 L. Q. REv. 36S, 371. Such a drastic change in the admin-
istration of justice seems remote. For proposals to standardize procedure, as in motor
tort litigation, see note 96 infra. These reforms, aimed at greater efficiency in civil pro-
cedure generally, are beyond the scope of this Comment
4. See note 23 infra.
5. Courts have refused to regard counsel fees as an element of damages, except in
some cases where the direct consequence of defendant's tortious conduct is to involve
plaintiff in litigation. See cases cited note 68 infra.
6. See generally 15 C. J. (1918) 19. The former theory is more commonly asserted.
Steele v. Lineberger, 72 Pa. St. Rep. 239 (1872). But in some states costs are by statute
penal in character. See ALA. CoDE ANx. (Michie, 1928) §§ 3734, 7221.
7. The amounts awarded are discussed in notes 20, 22 infra.
8. SmTrH, JusTicE AND THE PooR (1919) 23.
9. These criticisms are discussed in the authorities cited in note 23 infra.
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tionist tactics has suffered a real wrong; 1° but unless the conduct of his
opponent is sufficiently injurious to constitute a malicious prosecution,1 the
person wronged has no adequate remedy. It is obvious that reform of any
one part of the present civil procedure cannot provide a panacea for all these
abuses, but in the light of such glaring conflicts between the theory and prac-
tice of American costs procedure, a reexamination of the problem seems
pertinent.
The theory of costs developed early in the evolution of the English judicial
system.12 It was believed that a person who resorted to the courts and lost
his claim was morally at fault, and at common law the unsuccessful party was
fined, the revenue going to the king. But the fine represented no satisfaction
for the prevailing party, and judges began, in the exercise of their discretion.
to award the victorious plaintiff a reasonable sum as the costs of his suit.13
In 1275 the Statute of Gloucester 1 4 made this procedure compulsory in favor
of successful plaintiffs, and later statutes 15 decreed similar compensation for
successful defendants. By the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries,
when costs statutes were being enacted in America,' 6 the English system was
well established. Costs, which included substantial sums to defray fee, for
solicitors and counsel, were awarded as of course to the winning party at
law.
17
Although it would have been natural for American legislators to adopt
the English procedure, they did not do so,' 8 probably because at the time
10. The winning party is compensated under present costs statutes even when his
opponent acted in good faith. A fortiori he should be compensated when the loser acted
in bad faith. And the courts apply other procedural penalties based on the same assump-
tion. See p. 706 infra.
11. Most American courts follow the English rule and dismiss actions based on the
malicious prosecution of a civil suit on the ground that the costs awarded plaintiff in
the previous suit are an adequate remedy. HARPER, TRATISE ON ThE LAW OF TOaRTS
(1933) 582. The rule is reasonable in England where costs are substantial, but is inde-
fensible in America where costs are nominal. An increasing number of states allow actions
based on defendant's malicious prosecution of a civil suit. Ibid. See Bohlen, Fi/.t Years
of Torts (1937) 50 HARv. L. REv. 1225, 1240, 1241.
12. 4 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (2d ed. 1937) 536 et seq.; 2 POLLOCK
AND MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (2d ed. 1905) 597.
13. This practice developed in the early part of the thirteenth century. HULLocx,
LAW OF COSTS (1793) 4.
14. 6 EDW. I, c. 1 (1275). The pertinent provisions are stated in HULLOCI,, LAW or
COSTS (1793) 5.
15. Costs were allowed successful defendants in certain actions and courts by 23 HEN.
VIII, c. 15 (1531) and 8 ELIz., c. 2 (1565). In 1607 defendants were allowed to recover
costs in all actions in which the plaintiff was entitled to costs. 4 JAMrS I, c. 3 (1607).
16. These statutes are cited in note 20 infra.
17. The English system is discussed at p. 701 infra.
18. There is one exception. The New York costs statute enacted in 1818 provided
a system of substantial awards, similar to the English system, but fixing the amount of
the fees rather than leaving it to the discretion of the court. 3 N. Y. REv. STATS. (1829)
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the problem arose, the agrarian democrats were in power and the post-
Revolution antipathy to lawyers was in full bloom.10 As a result, only very
small fees for attorneys and witnesses were allowed.20 Most of these early
statutes are still in force.2 1 Those enacted later, while providing slight in-
creases in the amounts allowed to be taxed, follow the originals in foirnilY
Proponents of reform in the United States have largely advocated imitation
of the English costs procedure, which awards the prevailing party a substantial
sum in all cases as reimbursement for his e:penses.2 3 These recommendations,
inspired by impatience with the situation in this country, seem to over-look
some of the blatant weaknesses and undesirable features of the British system.
In England, costs are ordered to be taxed either as between "party and party"
c. X. But that practice was deemed unsatisfactory, and a system of nominal costs ,as
enacted. N. Y. Laws (1840) c. 386. See AurnoN, How SHALL MEn L.-mwvrnts Br- PA,?
(1840) 1-25.
19. See McCormick, Counsel Fees and Other Expenses of Litiqation as al Element
of Damages (1931) 15 MiriN. L. REv. 619, 641; Pom,, A Hundred Years of American
Law in 1 LAW, A CENruxy oF PRoGEss (1937) 9.
The frontier may also be responsible for the "sporting theory of justice" which has
permeated much of American procedure-an attitude which might tend to prevent award-
ing substantial sums as costs to the winning party. POUo, SPlInT OF ME Co:sr o- LAW
(1921) 124-8.
20. As an example, the Delaware statute, enacted in 1M6, provides that winning
party shall receive ;2.67 as attorney's fee for appearance, $2.67 as fee for drawing declara-
tion, $.13 for drawing warrant of attorney, etc. DEL. REv. CoDE (1935) § 5353; see also
MASs. GE.z. LAWS (1932) c. 261 §§ 1, 23 (enacted 1795; provides 12.50 as attorney's
fee); PA. STAT. (Purdon, 1936) tit. 17 §§ 1634, 1635 (enacted 1821; provides attorney's
fees of $1.50 up to $3.00).
21. The statutes cited in note 20 supra are still in force.
22. The statutes of Arizona, Kentucky and Minnesota are typical. AViz. Rnv. CODz
A.N-N. (Strucknmeyer, 1928) § 1467 (provides attorney's fee of $5.00-$15.0D, depending in
part on the amount in controversy); Ky. CODE ANI. (Carroll, Baldwin's ed. 1936)
CIv. P.Ac. §§ 889, 1742 (provides attorney's fee of $2.50-$5.00 at lax, and $10 in equity);
-Mlxx. STATS. ANN,. (Mason, 1927) c. 79 § 9471 (provides attorney's fee of $5.00-
$25.00).
The practice in New York is described in Dayton, Costs, Fees and Expenses in Liti-
gation ('May 1933) 167 ANNALs 32, 37. Parties are allowed various sums, from $10 to
$30, at different stages of the action. In rural communities, and in some unimportant
actions, these amounts may approximate real expense, but generally that is not the case.
The sums awarded bear no relation to the amount in controversy, or the time and effort
consumed in the litigation.
Award of costs in federal courts is controlled by REV. STAT. §§2, 82-4 (1875),
28 U. S. C. §§ 571, 572 (1935). The federal practice is similar to that used in the states.
See Payne, Costs in Common Law Actions in the Federal Courts (1935) 21 VA. L
REv. 397.
23. See Goodhart, Costs (1929) 33 YALE L. J. 849; Dayton, note 22 supra, at 35;
McCormick, note 19 supra, at 619; Rothschild, A New Deal n Costs (1934) 39 Con-.
L. J. 43; First Report of the Judicial Council of Massachusetts (Nov. 1925) 11 MAss.
L. Q. 63; Note (1938) 13 CALIF. S. B. J. 42; Note, N. J. L. J., May 9, 1935, p.4, coL;
Notes (1923) 46 N. J. L. J. 69, 133.
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or as between "solicitor and client."' 24 If the former order is given, which
is usually the case, the winning party recovers only such expenses as were
"necessary" to enable him to conduct the litigation; charges incurred merely
for conducting it more conveniently are deemed "luxuries" and must be paid
by the party incurring them.2 5 Party and party taxation allows the winning
party roughly only two-thirds of his actual expense. 20 On the other hand,
if costs are ordered to be taxed as between solicitor and client, a more liberal
allowance is made, and the recipient recovers all the expenses a solicitor would
"reasonably" incur in the conduct of the case.27
Costs, between ordinary adverse litigants, are rarely taxed on a solicitor
and client basis, and then only in equity.28 There the chancellor may, in his
discretion, penalize improper conduct in bringing or conducting an action by
an award of "reasonable" costs.29 The situation where such allowances are
usually made arises in cases involving the administration of a fund in the
hands of the court. In equity, and since 1929, in law, costs are awarded in
the discretion of the judge,8 0 but in practice they are regularly awarded to
the prevailing litigant on a party and party basis. As in the United States,
the authority to award costs is statutory,81 although equity has on occasion
claimed that such power is inherent in its jurisdiction.
82
Writers have argued that adoption of this procedure in America would do
much to prevent groundless litigation, declaring that the award of substantial
costs would deter the plaintiff from bringing suit and encourage the defendant
to defend. 33 There is no doubt that in England this practice has operated
to decrease litigation,3 4 but the difficulty is that it deters the bringing of
just claims as well as unjust ones, since the result of litigation involving much
expense is often sufficiently uncertain to discourage the bringing of suit when
there is a possibility that heavy costs will be taxed against the loser 35 It
is true that poor litigants fare better under the British rules which exempt
24. For a summary of the English law of costs, see 4 ENcYc. LAWS OF ENG. (3d
ed. 1937) 64 et seq.; Goodhart, supra note 23. The system in Canada is similar. WInI-
FIELD, LAW OF COSTS IN CANADA (1911).
25. 4 ENcYc. LAWS OF ENG. (3d ed. 1937) 71.
26. Note (1938) 82 SOL. J. 366.
27. However, this does not necessarily mean that all the charges a solicitor is entitled
to make against the client will be allowed. 4 ENCYC. LAws OF ENG. (3d ed. 1937) 71.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid; Andrews v. Barnes, 39 Ch. D. 133 (1888).
30. ANNUAL PRACTICE (1938) Ord. 65, r. 1. For a discussion of the principles
on which discretion will be exercised, see Donald Campbell & Co., Ltd. v. Pollak (1927]
A. C. 732.
31. 4 ENCYC. LAWS OF ENG. (3d ed. 1937) 65.
32. Andrews v. Barnes, 39 Ch. D. 133 (1888).
33. See note 23 supra.
34. GENERAL COUNCIL OF THE BAR, REPORT ON THE EXPENSE OF LITIGATION (May
18, 1931) 2; Note (1931) 75 SOL. J. 572.
35. See Wilson, supra note 3; Note (1930) 74 SOL. J. 450.
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the poor from payment of fees to court officers,30 in contrast with similar rules
which often preclude the poor from bringing suit in America.YT Yet exemption
from fees ordinarily required before trial is small solace to a litigant sub-
sequently ruined by a heavy costs bill against him.3 3 Again, the English
complain with reason that their system is complicated and unwieldly, that
the sums taxed as costs for the work of solicitors represent the value of
clerical rather than mental effort; that the bills of costs are too detailed and
the task of the taxing masters too difficult.3 9 As a result only the rich man
and the pauper can afford the luxury of English justice; others are under
strong compulsion to settle all but the most flagrant wrongs out of court.40
It seems clear that the English system is not in accord with the American
conception that every man has an inalienable right to go to law. Long-standing
apathy toward reforming the ancient statutes allowing nominal sums as costs
suggests that American sentiment does not conform to the English premise
that the winning party should be reimbursed in full for the necessary expense
of his suit. In certain instances, of course, the English system proves desir-
able,41 but an occasional fair result hardly warrants its use by America as
a pattern in reforming the present procedure.
Indeed, it may well be asked whether any costs at all should be awarded
when a claim or defense is brought in good faith. Such disputes are among
the ordinary inevitable incidents of living in organized society. They ought
not to be considered "harms" for which compensation, however small, should
be made. By their adjudication neither part, is wronged; hence it seems
reasonable to require each to bear the expense of advancing his own claim.4 2
But where litigation is brought in bad faith and not to vindicate a claim
believed to be just, it seems fair that the winning opponent who has been
subjected to an unjustifiable expense should be compensated to the extent
of his loss. With respect to such litigation, the award of substantial amounts
as costs merits further consideration.
36. See Goodhart, stpra note 23, at 875.
37. WILLOUGHBY, PRINCIPLES OF JuDicrAL ADmI muroz; (19-9) 571-573.
38. Typical instances are described in Coox, AiMur.ANca CnAstxa (London, 1928)
5 et seq.
39. Earl of Birkenhead, Costs (1925) 60 L. J. Pt. I, 89; Goodhart, supra note 23,
at 877.
40. Hillier, Speech at Annual Meeting of the Law Society (1932) 174 L T. 291, 293;
Notes (1931) 75 Sot. J. 433, (1929) 67 L. J. 214. In Note (1929) 73 Sot. J. 374, the
editor declares that the recent admonition of an English judge to a litigant of small
means amounted to: "You have no business to seek justice, you can't afford it" But
paupers may avoid costs by suing in forma paupers. The decrease in litigation resulting
from fear of being forced to pay the costs of the other party is accentuated by the high
fees of "fashionable" counsel. Notes (1939) 67 L. J. 174, 199.
41. Thus, where plaintiff's claim is brought in bad faith, defendant recovers at least
his "necessary" expense, as costs, by way of compensation.
42. The only logical alternative to this proposal is the suggestion that justice is a
service which should be dispensed by the state, the expense to be met by the public
treasury. See note 3 supra.
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The theory that one bringing a frivolous action or an action in bad faith
should be punished has its roots far back in legal history. The Athenian who
unjustly accused a citizen of an offence against the state was fined if he
failed to secure the votes of one-fifth of all the judges."3 Many procedural
penalties were likewise recognized in civil cases by the Roman jurists." No
costs, as such, were awarded under the earlier "formulary" procedure of the
Roman Law, even as damages. 45 But in certain actions, when the defendant's
denial was unsuccessful, a victorious plaintiff was awarded, in addition to
his ordinary recovery, special sums up to the equivalent of the whole amount
in controversy, although without reference to the defendant's guilt.40 A suc-
cessful defendant could recover similar penalties in the same actions, and
by bringing a suit known as iudichnt calumniac, he could also recover a tenth
of the amount in suit in any type of case, when the plaintiff had been guilty
of deceitful conduct.
47
By 200 A.D. the "extraordinary" procedure was displacing the older formu-
lary practice,4 8 and with it a new system developed which was probably bor-
rowed from the practice in the Eastern Empire, already two centuries old. 40
Under this procedure, the loser paid the costs of the prevailing party as a
penalty, imposed for mere temerity in bringing the action, as well as for the
malice and deceit which were the basis of the action iudicium cahmnodae.50
Neither the theory nor the practice under this rule are clear, but the penal
character of the discretionary power given the judiciary seems always to have
prevailed.-1 By the fifth century costs were either "judicial" or "extra-
judicial," the latter including the newly-recognized fees of advocates, and the
judge was compelled to decide the incidence of the court-fees, appearing in
the fifth century A.D., as "judicial" costs.52 The principle that the victorious
party should be reimbursed by the loser in the amount of the "judicial" costs0 0
was established under Justinian (483-565 A.D.), and this is said to be the
basis of the English practice.
5 4
43. BONNER, LAWYERS AND LITIGANTS IN ANCIENT ATNENS (1927) 51. The losing
party in civil actions may also have been required to pay certain amounts. See PurLI,
LES DEPENS ET LES FRAIS D'UNE INSTANCE CIVILE (1927) 6.
44. For a summary of these penalties, see ENGELMANN, HISTORY OF CONTINENTAL
CIVIL PROCEDURE (1927) 402.
45. ERMAN, LA RESTITUTION DE FRAIS DE PROCAS EN DROIT ROMAIN (1892) 109-113.
46. Ibid.
47. Id. at 114, n. 3.
48. ENGELITANN, op. cit. supra note 44, at 317; ERMAN, op. cit. supra note 45, at 119.
49. ER-MAN, Op. cit. mpra note 45, at 115, 122.
50. Ibid.
51. Id. at 115, 116. But see WALDNER, PRoCrSSKOsTmN (1882) 34 el seq.
52. ENGELMANN, op. Cit. supra note 44, at 403.
53. Ibid. "In expensarum causa victus victori condemnandus est." Code of Justinian:
C. 3. I. 13.6.
54. 3 BL. CoMM. *399.
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Although many procedural penalties were employed in the earliest German
and French procedures,n5 the best medieval example of the survival of the
Roman Law policy that judges should have discretionary power to award
costs as a penalty is the thirteenth century Spanish Code Las Siete Partidas,
which declared that costs might be awarded as a punishment for bad faith
in prosecuting or defending an action.r0 The procedural aspects of Las Siete
Partidas are thought to have been borrowed from the canonists, who were
influenced by the Roman system, 57 and this may be the link between the costs
power given in the Spanish Code and the analogous discretionary power
claimed by the English chancellors, who were usually clerics during the forma-
tive era.,5 The Code declared that those who instituted any suit "actuated
by malice and knowing they have no right to the property which they claim"
should "pay the costs incurred by the other party by reason of the suit."
But "when the judge thinks that the defeated party was actuated by any
just motive in bringing the suit or in making the defense, he has no reason
to order him to pay the costs."r 9 This procedure was used in the civil law
of Spain and is incorporated in the codes of civil procedure of most of the
Latin-American Republics and Puerto Rico.60
The practice in Puerto Rico"' affords a typical example of the operation
of the Spanish Civil Law concept as developed in the Supreme Court of
Spain.62 Costs, meaning reasonable expenses, including a reasonable attorney's
fee, are taxed against a party who, in the opinion of the court, is "blame-
55. ENGELm-AxN, op. cit. supra note 44, at 187, 695, 722, 727, 742 et seq.
56. LAs Srim PARrmAs (1263, enacted 1348) pt. III, tit. XXII, law VIII. LAs
Sim PArrmAs (Scott trans. 1931) 781.
57. LAs SmE PAnrMAS (Scott trans. 1931) Introduction, flax].
58. LANGDELL, EQUITY PLEADING (1877) § 22.
59. See note 56 supra.
60. OB EGoN, LATIN A,=rAxNca Com.cnnax. LAw (1921) 759. In discussing the
Spanish procedure it should be recognized that despite the fine language in the codes,
the ancient tradition of delay has persisted. See EDER, Law and Justice in Latin America
in 1 LAw-A CENTuRy oF PRoGREss (N. Y. Univ. 1935) 47, 62. But Puerto Rico, where
the fusion of common law and civil law systems has produced great progress and im-
provement, affords an example of the possibilities inherent in the Spanish theories. Id.
at 63. Since the Roman principle did not survive in the civil procedures of France and
Germany, those systems are not discussed here. In the French Tribuneaux de Commerce,
the unsuccessful party must pay costs, Which, however, include only stamp duties, regis-
tration and court fees and hlissiers expenses; each party in the action bears his own
counsel fees. GoIXIAND AND TnomtPsoy, Fazxc JUDiCLL Sys=a', (1919) 21. See also
PHiLip, op. cit. supra note 43, at 58.
In Germany the exact fees of attorneys for all kinds of work are fixed by statute,
and the client may be charged neither more nor less than the statutory schedule (unlile
the practice in England). The amount of the fee varies with the amount in controversy.
See Simon, Position of Attorneys at Law in Germany (1910) 22 Gnrza BAG 391. The
winning party recovers the statutory fees as costs. Hirschfeld, Legal Fees in Germany
(1899) 1 J. Coap. LEG. 75.
61. P. R. CODE Civ. PRoc. (1933) §§ 327-340.
62. See Martinez v. Padilla, 19 P. R. R. 555, 558 (1913).
19401
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worthy" or who shows "temerity and bad faith" in bringing or defending
the action.63 If the trial judge in the exercise of his discretion does not find
such conduct, no costs are taxed.64 There must be a clear showing of bad
faith, but the abuse need not be so flagrant as that required to induce an
English chancellor to tax costs as between solicitor and client. A party in
whose favor costs are awarded presents his bill of costs to the taxing officer,
who allows only such items as he considers reasonable, thus securing some
control over prolix, frivolous or dilatory practices in the course of the liti-
gation.65 The discretion of the trial court in taxing costs will not be reviewed
on appeal unless it can be shown that the discretion was abused00 The power
is frequently exercised, but the decisions of the lower courts are rarely al-
tered.
67
Although the civil law principle is not applied in any of the courts in the
United States, American courts have had some experience with the taxation
of attorneys' fees as costs, which suggests that the civil law theory does
not contradict any of the fundamental elements in the American judicial
tradition. Early attempts to recover counsel fees as a part of damages were
unsuccessful, mainly because the defendant would have had no corresponding
right if he was victorious. 8 However, there have gradually developed a few
notable exceptions. In civil actions under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act,
a successful plaintiff may recover counsel fees as an element of damages.00
Moreover, some states have enacted statutes providing for the recovery of
reasonable attorney's fees by the plaintiff in certain contract actions against
railroads, insurance companies and building contractors,70 or in the collection
63. P. R. CODE Civ. PROC. (1933) § 327. The doctrine stated in the statute is the
same as that declared in LAS SIErT PARTMAS. Vivas v. Hernaiz, Targa & Co., 24 P. R. R.
779, 783 (1917). The "blame," "temerity" and "bad faith" discussed by the court seem
analogous to the "temeritas" found in the Roman practice. See p. 704 supra. In Gras v.
Domenech, 42 P. R. R. 506, 511 (1931) the court said: "The holding of opposite and
debatable theories must not be considered as an act of obstinacy justifying the imposing
of costs."
64. See Raminez v. American Ry., 28 P. R. R. 168, 173 (1920).
65. P. R. CODE CIv. PROC. (1933) § 339.
66. GonzAlez v. Collazo, 25 P. R. R. 146 (1917).
67. See Castro v. Soci~t6 de Saint Jean, 34 P. R. R. 546, 549 (1925).
68. Oelrichs v. Spain, 15 Wall. 211 (U. S. 1872); Day v. Woodworth, 13 How. 363
(U. S. 1851); Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 Dall. 306 (U. S. 1796). But see comment of
Story, J. in Boston Mfg. Co. v. Fiske, 2 Mason 119 (C. C. 1st, 1820). Georgia has pro-
vided a contrary result generally by statute. GA. CIV. CODE (1933) §§ 20-1404, 105-2004.
Instances where the law allows counsel fees as an element of damages are reviewed
in Straus v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 297 Fed. 791, 811 (C. C. A. 2d, 1924).
69. 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 15 (1935).
70. Examples are reviewed in McCormick, note 19 supra, at 626; Pearson, Allowance
of Costs as Between Attorney and Client (1935) 9 F"A. L. J. 369; Notes (1934) 90 A. L. R.
530, (1921) 11 A. L. R. 884. Counsel fees are allowed plaintiff in proceedings for the
appraisal of stock in corporations in six states. SEcuaRrs AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION COM-
MITTEES (1938) Part VII, 606.
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of small contract claims generally. 7' Frequently such statutes require that
the plaintiff prove reluctance or delay on the part of the defendant in meeting
its obligations, but they rarely grant a similar right to the defendant if the
claim is defeated.7 2 The actions included in these statutes are mainly those
in which the power of one party would permit protraction of the litigation
and thus render the claim of the other virtually valueless.7 3 Nearly all have
been sustained as proper exercises of the police power.7 4 Again, a litigant
whose efforts have tended to protect or augment a fund in the hands of the
court for administration is usually entitled, in equity, to be reimbursed out of
the fund in the amount of his expenses, including a reasonable attorney's fee.Y
An excellent analogy to the civil law principle is found in litigation under
the Copyright Act.7 6 Under Section 40 of that statute, "the court may award
to the prevailing party a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs." It
has been urged that Congress did not intend that this power be punitive in
character, desiring only to compensate the prevailing party for the expense
of his action in a type of litigation where the expenses are apt to exceed the
value of the right and thus to encourage active protection of copyright privi-
leges.7 7 Nevertheless, in many recent cases the court has employed the power
as a double-edged weapon: one party is compensated, but the amount of the
attorney's fee taxed varies with the temerity of the losing party.78 The justice
of such procedure is manifest where one has been put to great expense in
defending a flimsy infringement claim brought in bad faith, or where "ob-
scurity is taking a long shot at success." 70 Why Congress has not provided
the same procedure for patent litigation is difficult to understand s °
71. Reasonable counsel fees are allowed successful plaintiffs in the collection of
many contract claims under $300 in Nebraska. Nan. Co'p. STAT. (1929) § 20-1801.
72. An exception is found in the California statute governing actions by materialmen:
the prevailing party receives a reasonable attorney's fee. 1 CArL Gran. LAws (Deering,
1937) Act 6423, § 2.
73. See note (1921) 11 A. L. R. 884, 897.
74. Notes (1934) 90 A.LR. 530, (1921) 11 A.L.R. 834.
75. Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U. S. 527 (1831). This problem is discussed in
Comment (1935) 35 CoL L. Rnv. 740.
76. 35 STAT. 1084 (1909), 17 U.S.C. §40 (1935).
77. Universal Film Mfg. Co. v. Copperman, 218 Fed. 577, 580 (C. C. A. 2d, 1914);
WEM, COPYRIGHT LAw (1917) 529-532.
78. See M[arks v. Leo Feist, Inc., 8 F. (2d) 460, 461 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925); Basevi
v Edward O'Toole Co., 26 F. Supp. 41, 50 (S.D. N.Y. 1933); Caruthers .v. R. .. 0.
Pictures, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 906, 903 (S. D. N.Y. 1937); Lowenfels v. Nathan, 2 F.
Supp. 73, 80 (S.D. N.Y. 1932). See also Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp.,
26 F. Supp. 134, 145 (S. D. N.Y. 1938), rezd, 106 F. (2d) 45, 55 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939).
79. See Woolsey, J. in Lowenfels v. Nathan, 2 F. Supp. 73, 80 (S. D. N.Y. 1932);
see also note 105 infra.
80. The Patent Act provides: "And whenever in any action a verdict is rendered for
the plaintiff, the court may enter judgment thereon for any sum above the amount found
by the verdict as the actual damages sustained, according to the circumstances of the
case, not exceeding three times the amount of such verdict, together with the costs. Rnv.
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Courts of equity in the United States have asserted inherent discretionary
power to award costs, but the sphere of their jurisdiction in this respect is
not clear. In Guardian Trust Company v. Kansas City Southern Railway
Company," a federal judge, after an exhaustive study of the precedents,
held that inherent power to award costs on an "attorney and client" basis
undoubtedly exists when charges of fraud are unsustained, the suit is vexa-
tious or a fiduciary has incurred expense in protecting trust property against
groundless actions. Relying on all three theories, the court ordered the
defendant to pay the reasonable expenses of the prevailing plaintiff, but on
appeal the Supreme Court reversed on other grounds without discussing the
problem raised below.8 2 In a later decision the Supreme Court also reversed
an allowance of attorneys' fees made by the circuit court of appeals,83 on the
ground that bad faith had not been found by the trial court, but implying
that in a proper case attorneys' fees could be allowed.8 4 The recent opinion
by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank,8 extending
the scope of the power to award attorney's fees in equity, suggests that the
opinion of the lower court in the Guardian case might be approved in a
situation where administration of a fund was not involved, but only vexatious
conduct or bad faith. In New Jersey the courts of equity have discretionary
power by statute to tax reasonable counsel fees and other expenses as part
of the costs, 88 but the power, like that of the federal courts, has been narrowly
exercised, and has been overlooked in avowedly vexatious litigation. 87 . The
existing equity doctrine, as discussed above, does not seem sufficiently broad
to meet the problem of strike-suits, even though a common form of such
litigation, by minority shareholders, is usually addressed to the equitable
jurisdiction of the court.88
It is submitted that a comprehensive discretionary power to tax substantial
costs, similar to the power given in the Copyright Act and the civil law
STAT. (1875) § 4919, 35 U. S. C. § 67 (1935). The difficulty involved in showing a right
to recover expenses is illustrated in Reed Roller Co. v. Hughes Tool Co., 12 F. (2d)
207, 210 (C. C.A. 5th, 1926).
81. 28 F. (2d) 233 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928).
82. Kansas City So. Ry. v. Guardian Trust Co., 281 U. S. 1 (1929).
83. Buchalter v. Rude, 54 F. (2d) 834 (C. C. A. 10th, 1931) (an action brought
to harass a pledgee seeking to establish validity of the pledgor's debt).
84. See Rude v. Buchalter, 286 U. S. 451, 459 (1932). In Gazan v. Vadsco Sales
Corp., 6 F. Supp. 568 (E. D. N. Y. 1934) a district judge, relying on the Guardian case,
assessed attorney's fees against the plaintiff in a vexatious stockholder's suit.
85. 307 U. S. 161 (1939) (Plaintiff's previous action established a lien on proceeds
of sale by trustee bank of bonds set aside to secure the res. He could then recover
expenses from proceeds, since as a result of the first decision and stare decisis, other
owners of trust funds could recover without litigation). Note (1939) 34 ILL. L. RFV. 220.
86. N. J. REv. STAT. (1937) tit. 2, c. 29, § 131.
87. General Investment Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 88 N. J. Eq. 237, 102 Atl. 252
(Ch. 1917) (Clarence H. Venner referred to as a "professional agitator") ; Continental
Securities Co. v. Northern Securities Co., 66 N. J. Eq. 274, 57 Atl. 876 (Ch. 1904).
88. Such litigation is discussed in Comment (1934) 34 CoL. L. Rav. 1308.
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procedure should be given by statute to judges throughout the country so
that it can be exercised in any type of case. The practice proposed could do
much to deter claims and defenses brought in bad faith or for ulterior ends.
Where it did not prevent such action, the power would at least enable the
judge to compensate the winning party for the expense caused him by the
misuse of judicial machinery. Such abuses are not always apparent to the
judge, but they are notorious in at least two types of litigation.
Actions against corporations and their officers brought by security holders,
not in good faith, but to secure payments or advantages unwarranted by
the size of their interests, by exploiting the nuisance value of the action, are
a cancerous by-product of corporate structure8s The efforts of courts and
legislators to decrease such litigation, by restricting the rights of all security
holders or by denying preliminary injunctions after inquiring into the plain-
tiff's motive, have left much to be desired, 0 and do nothing to reimburse
the defendant once such suits have been brought. Here at least it seems that
the courts have been fully aware of the nature of the plaintiff's motive0 1 and
could tax substantial costs if the power were available.
Nor is that the only field where such abuses flourish: the prevalence of
fraud and bad faith in tort actions arising out of automobile collisions has
been widely investigated and discussed. -2 In this type of action the bad
faith is of another sort, since the relief asked is the genuine objective; but
many actions are based on fictional injuries brought in the vell-warranted
expectation that the insurance company behind the defendant will settle rather
than defend. 3 Taxing the expenses of litigation in favor of the victorious
defendant in such actions would encourage the defense of at least the more
flagrant claims and discourage lawyers who contemplate bringing others. 4
It does not appear that such litigation is decreasing, especially since the wide-
spread enactment of financial responsibility laws.0  While the taxation of
89. Ibid.
90. Id. at 1318 et seq.
91. Id. at 1310, n. 8.
92. See CLARK AND SHumAAN, LAW. ADmuixsmrL. Txo. I. Co!.x:crxcur (1937) 169
et seq.; LEvIs A-D CLARu. REPoa-r Byv Commrrr To STTIfk Co!arEsA"oz.-N ron AUTO-
xoBiLE AccrDExTs TO COLI lA U-mvmsrrY COUNCIL FOR Soca. Rsr,rcu (1932)
1 et seq.; M.. JUSTICE WASSERVOGEL, Report on the Inzesligation of A.mbulance Casihng
in New York (Nov. 1928) 14 fAss. L. Q. 1; REPORT Or TE COMM=rrrs OP" C-NSNrIS
To THE LAw ASSOCIATIOx OF PHI.ADELmHIA (Supp. Nov. 1928) 14 MASS. L. Q. 1;
Monaghan, Liability Claim Racket (1936) 3 LAw & Coxmrrn,. PROn. 491.
93. See Kearney, Fake Accidents Incorporated, SAT. EvE. POST, Apr. 11, 1936, p. 18.
Factors inducing insurance company defendants to settle are discussed in the PrLA-
DELPHlA REPORT, op. cit. supra note 92, at 40.
94. The Massachusetts judicial Council in its first report, cited note 23 mspra, pro-
posed the adoption of the British costs system to deter this type of litigation. Perhaps a
recognition of the weaknesses of that system prevented adoption of the plan.
95. Braun, Financial Responsibility Laws (1936) 3 LAw & Colnmmp. PnoB. 505.
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substantial costs would obviously not be a frontal attack on this problem, 0
its tendencies for reform, apart from the compensation of victims of unjusti-
fiable litigation, should not be overlooked. And of course litigation in bad
faith is not confined to minority stockholders and ambulance chasers; the
problem is general in scope.97
Discretionary power to tax expenses as costs may become desirable during
the course of any action, whether or not begun in good faith, to punish
parties or their attorneys for dilatory tactics and proceedings in bad faith,
and to compensate the opposite party for the expense caused by such tactics.
Under a practice like that of England, this result is achieved through dis-
allowance of certain items in the bill of costs. 8 The federal courts and some
state courts have power to impose penalties against parties or attorneys whose
vexatious and unreasonable or negligent conduct has increased the costs of
the action.99 In many of the states the highest appellate court has authority
to assess a certain fraction of the amount in controversy against a party who
brings an appeal for purposes of delay.'00 Furthermore, the principle that
a party or attorney resorting to dilatory or vexatious activities in the course
of litigation should be required to compensate his opponent for the expense
incurred in opposing such tactics, has been adopted in the new Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure in connection with depositions,' 0 ' discovery 102 and affi-
davits on motion for summary judgment. 103 The propriety of these measures
has not been questioned, and it would seem there is no reason why a similar
principle should not be extended to all litigation as a device for encouraging
the despatch and simplicity which modern codes of civil procedure are designed
to achieve.
Two difficulties are apparent at the out-set: (1) how shall the judge de-
termine what constitutes "bad faith" or "vexatious" conduct, and (2) how
shall he determine what are "reasonable" expenses? The essence of the
power lies in its discretionary character. It seems a sound assumption that
96. Compare the proposal to abolish fault as the basis of liability and to set up special
administrative bodies to handle the problem. See COLUMDIA REPORT, op. cit. Supra note 92.
97. See Rothschild, note 23, supra; Note (1938) 13 CAmF. S. B. J. 42.
98. See Goodhart, note 23 supra, for a discussion of costs as a penalty for procedural
delays and other abuses in England.
99. The federal statute provides: "If any attorney . . . appears to have multiplied
the proceedings in any cause before [the] court, so as to increase costs unreasonably and
vexatiously, he shall be required, by order of the court, to satisfy any excess of costs so
increased." Rxv. STAT. § 982 (1875), 28 U. S. C. § 829 (1935). The word "costs" in-
cludes expenses and taxable disbursements. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Yankee Film
Co., 192 Fed. 134 (S. D. N. Y. 1912), modified, 201 Fed. 63 (C. C.A. 2d, 1912). Cf.
Anx. STAT. ANN. (1937) § 647.
100. The Ohio provision is typical. Oio GEN. CoDE ANN. (Page, 1937) § 12223-36.
101. FED. RuL2s Crv. PRoc. 30(d), (g). Cf. MINN. STAT. ANN. (Mason, 1927)
§ 9833.
102. FaD. RuLEs Crv. PRoc. 37(a), (c).
103. Id. 56(g).
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the trial judge who has seen and heard the parties can make a reasonable
estimate of their sincerity and the propriety of their methods of conducting
the action. Motives may be concealed, sometimes with success, but the margin
of error in this matter should be no greater than in other parts of the law
where the guiding standard is equally vague and the operative facts as difficult
to determine. Indeed, if errors are made, they are more likely to be made
on the side of tolerance than tyranny. 04 In any event, abuse of the discretion
would be reviewable on appeal, giving the appellate court an opportunity to
direct uniform practice.'0 5
The problem of what constitutes "reasonable" expenses is not a new one.
In the allowance of attorney's fees from a fund in court, 00 in bankruptcy
and in reorganization, 07 in statutory actions against railroads and insurance
companies, °8 and in suits by attorneys against their clients, 10 3 the courts
have faced this problem frequently, and have defined with some clarit, the
factors involved in calculating a reasonable attorney's fee.1 0 Rule 12 of
the Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association mentions
a number of factors; among them the time spent, the amount involved, the
skill required, the result obtained and the customary fee. Of course, the
rule is necessarily elastic, and its application requires the sound discretion
of the judge. But the task has not been highly complicated' and in general
the results have not aroused serious opposition. The principal criticism has
come from the bench, directed at the sometimes exorbitant claims for fees
filed by the attorneys." 2 It is possible that under the suggested procedure
victorious parties might claim grossly disproportionate costs and in some
cases precipitate an excited controversy subsequent to the decision on the
104. The courts have never been harsh in the use of procedural penalties and in deter-
mining awards of fees and expenses. See Comment (1936) 3 U. Cr. L. Rcv. 476
(administration of reorganization expenses under § 77B). A reluctance to impose penalties
would, of course, go far to defeat the purpose of the reform proposed.
105. It is apparent that the phrase '%ad faith" of necessity has no e.,mct meaning.
It should be a somewhat flexdble tool, available in many situations. But it seems clear
that mere "unreasonableness" ought not be penalized by the award of costs. See Bohlen,
supra note 11, at 1240. In France, however, it appears that "reasonableness" is the
standard: one who brings an action without reasonable grounds may be liable to an
action in tort for damages. Amos AND WArToN, I1aonucrio: To F=,acr- LAw (1935)
255, 256; Amos, Abusive Exercise of Rights According to French Law (1900) 2 J. Coup.
LEG. 453, 459.
106. See note 75 mpra.
107. See Comment (1939) 52 HIAtv. L Rsv. 1349.
108. See note 70 mpra.
109. See WooD, FEE CoNTraAcTs oF LAvrats (1936) 1 et seq.
110. These factors are discussed in Note (1939) 6 U. Cur. L. RE%. 484.
111. See statement by Woolsey, J.: "It is possible to arrive at a proper charge in
almost any case without much difficulty." In re Osofsky, 50 F. (2d) 925, 927 (S. D. N. Y.
1931) (stating factors to be considered).
112. See generally In re Faramount-Publix Corp., 12 F. Supp. 823 (S. D. N. Y.
1935); ARNOLD, FoLxELoa oF CAprrA.s (1937) 258.
